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The
Experience Under the European Convention
on Human Rights
COMPLIANCE WITHOUT REMANDS:

John Cary Simst
Those familiar with practices followed in the federal and state courts
within the United States are well aware of the central role played by
"remands" from appellate courts in achieving compliance with their
judgments. In the run-of-the-mill case, the reviewing court does not direct
the disposition of the matter, but rather remands the case to a lower court
for further handling in accordance with whatever guidance is to be found in
the appellate ruling.
The topic that this article will address sits well outside the familiar
world of remands. Without, I hope, imposing any inappropriate diversion
on those participating in this symposium with the intention of deliberating
on the remand process, I intend to acquaint the participants with an
alternative judicial universe in which remands are not utilized-in which, in
fact, remands are not even possible. Examination of this distinctive arena in
which appellate judgments are enforced without remands, and identification
of the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach, may help us to
understand our own system more thoroughly and plan reforms more
confidently.
My attention will be focused on the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights (sometimes referred to here as the "European Court" or the
ECHR). 1
This court, the judicial arm of the Council of Europe, is
responsible for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights (the
"Convention"),2 and it rendered 844 judgments in the year 2002, 3 many

t

Professor of Law, University of the Pacific/McGeorge School of Law.
1. For a history of the European Court of Human Rights see REGISTRAR OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INFORMATION DOCUMENT, at http://www.echr.
coe.int!Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (Sept. 2003).
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (modified Nov. 1, 1998) [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en
/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited March 22, 2004). The Convention entered into force on
September 3, 1953, and was extensively modified by Protocol 11, effective November 1, 1998.
Unless otherwise specified, the Article numbers used here are those of the current convention
text, although some Articles were previously identified by a different number.
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times the number of judgments handed down by the Supreme Court of the
United States.4 However, unlike the Supreme Court, which can and usually
does remand cases to the federal and state courts whose judgments have
been reviewed, the ECHR is a supranational tribunal that is entirely without
power to remand a case to a national court.
What makes the enforcement process for ECHR judgments so
interesting is that the court announces nearly one thousand judgments a
year, often in high-profile cases on which emotions run high, yet it has no
remand mechanism at its command. Nonetheless, there is a broad
consensus that the level of compliance with ECHR judgments is very high,
even if compliance is not always cheerfully and quietly carried out by the
affected states.
The achievement of such remarkable success in
enforcement, without resort to the method traditionally relied upon in the
United States, commands our attention and analysis.
THE ECHR AND ITS MILIEU
The European Court of Human Rights is provided for in Article 19 of
the Convention.5 It is an organ of the Council of Europe, which comprises
forty-five nations within Europe, with a population of over 800 million.6
The Council of Europe has a much more extensive membership than. the
European Union, which presently has fifteen members, with ten additional
members entering in 2004.7 Not surprising in light of the large number of
member states, the Council of Europe includes states with quite diverse
political processes, economic circumstances, social structures, languages,
religious traditions, and legal systems.
The number of judges on the ECHR is equal to the number of High
Contracting Parties, that is, the states that have ratified the Convention. 8
Each High Contracting Party nominates three candidates to serve "with
respect to" it, and the ParliamentarY Assembly of the Council of Europe
3. See SUBJECT-MATTER OF JUDGMENTS DELIVERED BY THE COURT IN 2002 63, at http:/I
www.echr.coe.intJEng!EDocs/subjectmatter2002table.pdf (last visited March 22, 2004).
4. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: The Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REv. 480, 487 (2003) (in
the 2002 Term, ninety-two cases were disposed of on review and fifty-three others were decided
summarily).
5. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 19.
6. See, e.g., Council of Europe, available at http://www.coe.int/DefaultEN.asp (last
visited March
7. For example, Russia, Turkey, and Switzerland are each members of the Council of
Europe, but will not be members of the European Union even after the 2004 expansion. See
Council of Europe, supra note 6.
8. There are currently forty-four judgeships, one of which is vacant. See European Court
of Human Rights, supra note 1.
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9

then elects a judge off the list by majority vote. There is no formal limit on
the number of judges who may be elected from a given state, but under this
system each High Contracting Party generally nominates its own citizens,
with the fmal composition of the court naturally tending to be one in which
each High Contracting Party sees one of its nationals sitting as a judge. 10
Although nationality figures prominently in the election process, the judges
serve in their individual capacity, not as governmental representatives.n
The court sits in Strasbourg, France. 12
Although the jurisdiction of the ECHR originally extended only to
complaints lodged by one High Contracting Party against another,
complaints filed by individuals and organizations against a High
Contracting Party have long constituted the main work of the court. 13
Especially in light of the fact that almost any judgment determining that a
High Contracting Party has violated the Convention involves just one of the
state's own nationals, it is easy to see why issues of compliance abound.
No government finds it pleasant to be declared to be in violation of its legal
obligations, even by its own courts, and it is not unusual for the affected
state to manifest certain distaste for the outcome, and perhaps even a
reluctance to carry out a court's decision. Whatever may be the obstacles to
compliance within a given state, however, the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment by a supranational court is much more likely to be controversial
and to trigger resistance to compliance, at least among some elements of the
state's political leadership.
Because of the natural and quite predictable (if somewhat uneven)
reluctance of states to comply fully and promptly with some adverse
decisions coming from Strasbourg, the Convention itself sets out the
obligation to comply, and establishes a mechanism for bringing about
compliance. Article 46 states:
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

9. !d.
10. The rare exceptions are where a very small state nominates a candidate from outside
its borders. Thus, Judge Lucius Caflisch, who is Swiss, was elected by Liechtenstein. See
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 1.
11. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 21(2).
12. See European Court of Human Rights, available at http://www.echr.coe.int (last
visited March 22, 2004).
13. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 34. See also id. at
article 33.
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2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.14

The Committee of Ministers (the "Committee") is made up of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Council of Europe,
although the functions of the Committee with respect to human rights
judgments are normally carried out by the deputies of the ministers, acting
as the Committee.15 The Committee meets six times a year to carry out its
duties under the Convention, and the deliberations take place behind closed
doors, although the agendas for the meetings are now made public, as are
the actions taken. 16 The procedures followed by the Committee regarding
its supervision of the execution of ECHR judgments are set out in rules that
were adopted on January 10, 2001.17
The judgments of the ECHR are transmitted to the Committee pursuant
to Article 46 of the Convention, and the case is then placed on the
Committee's agenda "without delay."18 Where there has been a violation of
the Convention, "the Committee shall invite the State concerned to inform it
of the measures which the State has taken in consequence of the judgment,
having regard to its obligation to abide by it under Article 46, paragraph 1,
of the Convention."19
While neither a detailed knowledge of the substantive rights protected
by the Convention nor an intimate familiarity with the case law developed
by the ECHR is necessary for the discussion of enforcement which follows,
there is a need to perceive the range of remedies available under the
Convention. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
If the court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention
or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
14. !d.
15. Prior to the far-reaching revisions of the Convention that took effect on November 1,
1998, the Committee of Ministers decided some cases arising under the Convention, but it no
longer has that authority. P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 267-68 (3d ed. 1998).
16. A very useful description of the operation of the Committee is to be found in CLARE
OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 420-36 (3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter OVEY & WHITE]. For a succinct and informative summary, see a monograph
published by the Council of Europe. ELISABETH LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, THE EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002) [hereinafter LAMBERT
ABDELGAWAD]. My description of the functions of and procedures followed by the Committee
of Ministers draws on both of these sources.
17. Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers for the application of article 46,
paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights, available at http://cm.coe.int/
intro/e-rules46.htm [hereinafter Committee ofMinisters].
18. !d. at Rule 2.
19. !d. at Rule 3a.

36:0639]

COMPLIANCE WITHOUT REMANDS

643

Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party.20

The recent case Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom21 provides an
illustration of the ECHR's approach in calculating just satisfaction. The
applicants were two former members of the British armed forces who had
been discharged because of their homosexuality?2
The ECHR found a
violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees a right to respect
for one's private life?3 Just satisfaction, in this context, was found to
encompass: (1) non-pecuniary loss, such as psychological damage; (2)
pecuniary loss resulting from the disruption of the applicants' careers,
including past loss of earnings, future loss of earnings, and loss of pension
benefits; (3) costs and expenses of the litigation; and (4) interest, payable
beginning three months after entry of the award. What is most pertinent to
this discussion is that "just satisfaction" represents a direction to pay a
certain amount of money, and thus "it is an obligation capable of direct and
clear performance."24 The only enforcement issue- that is likely to arise as
to such relief is whether the payment ordered has in fact been made by the
state responsible for the violation.
"Just satisfaction is the only measure that the European Court can order
a state responsible for a violation of the Convention to take."25 As will be
described more completely in the discussion below, however, final
resolution of a case before the court in which a violation has been found
often depends upon the state's implementation of both "individual
measures" and "general measures" designed to put the injured party in the
same position as enjoyed prior to the violation, and to prevent new
violations of a similar nature. Individual measures can take many forms,
such as reopening domestic legal proceedings; vacating a judgment or
preventing it from being enforced; modification of police records to
expunge a conviction; or issuing an entry or residence permit to a non
citizen. General measures may assume even a greater variety of forms,
including most prominently: amending the offending Constitutional
provision, statute, or rule; changing administrative practices; altering case

20. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2.
21. 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548, 548 (2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiew
Root.asp?Item=1&Action=Html&X=327235130&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O
(last visited March 22, 2004).
22. Id. 2.
23. Id. 62-105.
24. LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 13.
25. Id.
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law to conform to the principles announced by the ECHR; publicizing the
court's ruling or issuing a circular letter alerting relevant officials to the law
declared by the court; or executive action to conform to the newly
announced principles, or a declaration or solemn undertaking by the
officials concerned of what actions they will take in the future to assure
compliance.
Once the court's judgment has been transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers, the role of the ECHR is at an end?6 As described above, the
Committee promptly puts the matter on its human rights agenda, and
continues to revisit the case at regular intervals, both to determine whether
the award for just satisfaction has been paid, and to decide whether
appropriate individual and reneral measures have been taken. Interim
resolutions may be adopted,2 and this is particularly likely to occur when a
· case languishes for long periods without the state involved taking actions
which are considered to constitute full compliance with the court's
judgment. Ultimately, when the Committee determines that full compliance
has been achieved, it adopts a formulaic resolution reciting the history of
the case and stating that the Committee "has exercised its functions under
Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention in this case." 28
THE UNCONVENTIONAL NATURE OF THE CONVENTION'S ENFORCEMENT
PROCESS

Judged from an American perspective, the process described above is
decidedly irregular. For example, when the Supreme Court of the United
States decides a case, it has the power to remand the case to the federal or
state court from which it came.
The Supreme Court can make its
instructions to the lower court as specific as necessary to assure that the
correct path is followed on remand, but the Court usually feels no need to
be heavy-handed, perhaps because its power to control future proceedings is
so apparent. Hart and Wechsler offer this crisp summary:
Normally the Supreme Court, when reversing a state court
judgment, remands the case for proceedings "not inconsistent"
with the Court's opinion. The state court is thus free to resolve
26. Sometimes the European Court issues an opinion finding a violation but reserves the
remedial issues for further consideration. In such cases, it is only the second decision
addressing remedy that is subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers as to its
execution, since the first opinion does not constitute the "final judgment" necessary to trigger
the enforcement process under article 46.
27. Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 7.
28. See Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 8.
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any undecided questions or even alter its determination of
underlying state law. The reversal may not, therefore, be decisive
ofthe fmaljudgment.29

If the prevailing party before the Supreme Court considers the lower
court's response to the remand to be unfaithful to the Supreme Court's
decision, a new petition for review provides a ready mechanism for
obtaining full compliance. The key element of this enforcement system is
that the Supreme Court itself can decide how to structure the remand to
achieve its purpose and can even decide to forgo a remand which is not
likely to be effective. Thus, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 30 the first round
of litigation produced a remand with instructions to the Virginia Court of
Appeals that judgment be entered in accordance with the original ruling of
the trial court.31 The Court of Appeals declined to do so, however, taking
the view that the matter was not one which could, under Article III of the
Constitution, properly be heard at all by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The second time around, the Supreme Court acted forcefully to
implement its decision without further involvement, or possible
interference, by the Virginia Court of Appeals: "It is the opinion of the
whole court, that the judgment of the court of appeals of Virginia, rendered
on the mandate in this cause, be reversed, and the judgment of the district
court, held at Winchester, be, and the same is hereby affrrmed."32
Compare to this commanding position occupied by the Supreme Court
of the United States, that of the ECHR. The review conducted in
Strasbourg, in which an international tribunal reviews allegations that the
matters considered by national courts have been disposed of in a manner
that conflicts with the European Convention, is not part of the work of the
national court systems from which the cases arise. There is no mechanism
for remand from the ECHR to any national court.33 The ECHR is not
empowered to give any direction at all to the national courts.
Even more intriguingly, the ECHR cannot even order a state that has
been held to have violated the Convention to take any action other than the
payment of just satisfaction as determined by the court.34 There is
absolutely no authority for the court to enjoin a state from taking any

29. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET. AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 481 (5th ed. 2003). Federal courts would be at least as likely to give full
effect to a ruling by the Supreme Court, and perhaps even more so.
30. 14 u.s. 304, 323 (1816).
31. Id. at 323-24.
32. Jd. at 362.
33. Article 46 provides the only enforcement mechanism under the Convention.
34. See text accompanying notes 60-84.
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particular action (such as continuing to enforce a Constitutional provision or
statute that has been held by the court to violate the Convention) or to order
it to take any particular acts to undo the harm caused by the violation or to
bring itself into compliance for the future. Even the one tangible obligation
that the court can impose-payment of just satisfaction-is entirely out of
its hands as to execution. The court has no means to itself bring about the
attachment of assets or the use of other means of execution of judgment,
much less the contempt power that American courts have available to bring
about compliance with their orders.
The real-world issues presented by efforts to bring about compliance
with decisions of the ECHR will be developed below.
However, as a
foundation for that discussion it is critical to understand that the court is
entirely without power to enforce its decisions itself. If enforcement is to
be achieved, it must be rendered by the states involved, brought about by
the Committee of Ministers, or achieved through some other mechanism.
The standard approach used by American courts-remands to the lower
courts with instructions to act consistently with the opinion, backed up by
the prospect of further review or even use of the contempt power-is not
available.
Plainly, there have been cases, sometimes even entire classes of cases,
in which even with remands and close supervision of enforcement
American appellate courts have found it difficult to get their decisions
followed. The Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit certainly faced great challenges in achieving integration of
the public schools following Brown v. Board of Education.35 Those cases,
however, stand out as relatively rare exceptions to a general pattern of
compliance. The question to which this paper now turns is whether, lacking
the remand power or any other tool of direct enforcement, the European
court has been successful in garnering respect for and compliance with its
judgments.
COMPLIANCE BY STATES FOUND To HAVE VIOLATED THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION

Imagine for a moment that some international tribunal (for instance, the
International Court of Justice, or some similar body whose jurisdiction the
United States had accepted) ruled that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy
35.

347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an engaging description of the arduous process by which the

Brown principle was implemented, see JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY
OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT'S BROWN DECISION INTO A
REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981).
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being implemented by the United States military violated the international
obligations of the United States and therefore needed to be abolished.
Judging by the political furor that gave rise to the policy in the first place, in
which President Clinton's campaign promise to end the exclusion of gays
from the United States military was swamped by a wave of congressional,
military, and public opposition, it is easy to contemplate the harsh
denunciations that would be issued. It would be extremely likely that
United States compliance with the international court's decision would be
frustrated, perhaps indefinitely, by withdrawal from the treaty commitment
on which the ruling was based, a statutory enactment prohibiting any
alteration of United States policy to bring about compliance with the ruling,
or perhaps even serious consideration of a Constitutional amendment.
The hypothetical scenario set out above is, of course, not really
hypothetical as applied to the United Kingdom. Britain had excluded gays
from its armed forces, and yet in the Lustig-Prean36 case described above
and in Smith v. United Kingdom,37 also decided on September 27, 1999, the
ECHR determined that the exclusion violated the Convention.
The
response? The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence abandoned its
exclusionary policy, and gays were allowed to serve, effective January 12,
2000.38
While the United Kingdom's compliance with the ECHR's
interpretation of the Convention as applied to the treatment of homosexuals
was a dramatic event, that illustration of the effective enforcement of ECHR
judgments is by no means anomalous. For example, Professors Helfer and
Slaughter, declared that "[S]upranational adjudication in Europe is a
remarkable and surprising success," and recognized that the "rate of
compliance by states with the ECHR's rulings is extremely high" in a
comprehensive law review article addressing the "central question" of
whether the success of supranational adjudication in Europe can be
transplanted to other regions of the globe.39 Professor Kay has observed
that the states found to have violated the Convention routinely "both pay the

36. See supra note 21.
37. 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot.
asp?Item=1&Action=Html&x=326193754&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last
visited March 22, 2004).
38. Sarah Lyall, British, Under European Ruling, End Ban on Openly Gay Soldiers, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al.
39. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276, 296 (1997).
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compensation ordered by the Court and also adjust their laws and
governmental practices to conform to the Court's interpretations."40
Some sense of the sweeping changes that have been accepted by states
in order to respect and implement the judgments of the ECHR can be
obtained by reviewing the compilation available at the court's website:41
[Ireland:] The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993, which
entered into force on 7 July 1993, decriminalised homosexual acts
conducted in private between consenting male adults of or over the
age of 17.42
[Spain:] In a judgment of 16 December 1991 the Constitutional
Court ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings against the
applicants. They were later acquitted.43
[Italy:] The new Code of Criminal Procedure, which entered into
force on 24 October 1989, stipulated that an indictment should be
drafted in the language of the accused if it does not appear from
the file that the accused knows Italian.44
[United Kingdom:] The system for the administration of legal aid
was reformed by the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 which came
into effect on 1 April1987.45
[Norway:] On 16 January 1991 the Norwegian authorities
distributed a circular letter to all courts describing the implications
of the Court's judgment. It was stressed that measures should be
taken to ensure that decisions in cases of preventive detention
were taken "speedily.'.4 6
[Austria:] In a judgment of 18 May 1993 the Supreme Court
changed the case-law of the Austrian courts regarding the
interpretation of Article 111 of the Criminal Code (defamation) in
order to comply with the requirements of the Convention.47
[Denmark:] In a decision of 28 October 1994 the Supreme Court
referred to the judgment of the European Court in acquitting a
40. Richard S. Kay, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Authority of
Law, 8 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 217, 218 (1993) (footnote omitted).
41. The following examples, identified by item number, are drawn from a list of more than
300 cases that appear on the court's website, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng!EDocs/
EffectsOfJudgments.html (last visited March 22, 2004).
42. !d. at item number 64.
43. !d. at item number 67.
44. !d. at item number 79.
45. !d. at item number 82.
46. !d. at item number 91.
47. !d. at item number 121.
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journalist who was charged with invasion of privacy in relation to
a minister. This judgment is one of a number in which the
Supreme Court and the Appeal Courts applied the jurisprudence of
the European Court.48

As will be discussed below, compliance with judgments of the ECHR is
not always prompt and complete. There have been, and remain, cases and
even large groups of cases where efforts at execution of the judgments have
been met with delay or even obdurate resistance. However, what is striking,
especially in light of the court's lack of enforcement power and its inability
to remand cases for further action, is the generally high level of compliance
that has been demonstrated. On the surface, the institutional structures
available under the Convention do little to generate confidence that full
implementation of judgments will be the norm, yet actual compliance has
consistently been achieved at a very high level. That experience prompts
further inquiry into why the ECHR's interpretations of the Convention are
enforced so much more successfully than one might predict based on an
examination of the organizational structures alone.
ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT REMANDS

Some of the judgments of the ECHR, even if highly controversial, can
be enforced without difficulty simply because compliance does not require
much of the state involved. While payment of the fixed sum set by the
ECHR as just satisfaction may on occasion stimulate controversy, that
usually does not occur. Even a state that vigorously objects to the court's
holding may pay the amount owing and end, once and for all, that stage of
the controversy.
For example, few actions taken by the ECHR have ever outraged the
British to the degree that the September 27, 1995 judgment in the McCann
v. United Kingdom case did.49 Three IRA terrorists were shot dead in
Gibraltar on March 6, 1988 by members of the United Kingdom's Special
Air Service (SAS). 50 The British government took the position that the
shootings were justified, being attributable to the soldiers' efforts to prevent
the terrorists from pushing a button that would detonate a large bomb.51
The representatives of the estates of the three individuals who were killed
48. Id. at item number 228.
49. 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1996), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intfhudocNiewRoot.
asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=326192922&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O
(last
visited March 22, 2004).
50. Id. 59-67, 77-81.
51. !d. 132.
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alleged that the killings were in effect nothing but extrajudicial
executions.52 A closely-divided ECHR voted 10-9 that there had been a
violation of Article 2 (paragraph 2a) of the Convention, with the majority
holding that "the Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three
terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely
necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence ...."53
Many in Britain reacted to the court's decision with fury. For example,
in the House of Commons, Chairman Sir Ivan Lawrence of the Home
Affairs Select Committee attacked the ECHR in these terms: "The British
people are getting fed up with being told what to do by this interfering
foreign court which does not appear to know or care about British culture
and tradition."54 Home Secretary Michael Howard of the then-Tory cabinet
responded that he had considerable sympathy with the view expressed.55 It
had earlier been reported that Prime Minister John Major had hinted that the
Gibraltar case and other setbacks suffered by the United Kingdom before
the European Court might cause it to withdraw from the Convention.5 6 The
government also "launched a diplomatic offensive across Europe aimed at
garnering support to curb the powers" of the court. 57
For all the controversy surrounding· the McCann58 case, it led to no
enforcement problem at all. The court declined to award any damages in
the case, and the United Kingdom promptly paid the £38,700 owing for
costs and expenses (less the amount previously advanced by the Council of
Europe for legal aid).59 The fact that there were many in Britain who found
the court's ruling that there had been a violation of the Convention
offensive was essentially beside the point, since the relief awarded was so
modest that Britain was ewilling to make the payment called for by the
court's judgment.
As the history of McCann demonstrates, enforcement problems are
unlikely to prove substantial when the court, while finding that a violation

52. Jd.151.
53. Jd.213.
54. Rowan Dore, Howard Under Fire After Tory Attacks "Interfering" European Court,
PRESS ASSOCIATION, Dec. 5, 1996, at Parlimentary News.
55. Jd.
56. Michael White, Ministers Seek Curb on Rights: Europe-Wide Offensive After
Embarrassing Rulings, GUARDIAN, Apr. 2, 1996, at 1.
57. Id. See also, Lord Mackay of Clashfem, UK Success at the European Court and
Commission of Human Right is Not a Rare Event, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1996, at 18 (Lord
Mackay, the Lord Chancellor, describing his effort to promote reform of the ECHR).
58. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
59. McCann,222.
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has occurred, finds either that no just satisfaction is called for or that a small
payment will suffice.
Since McCann involved a specific event, rather than an ongoing series
of events or the application of a policy, rule, or statute of continuing effect,
a payment of just satisfaction was the only relief that was realistically
available. In many other situations, at least the consideration of other relief
is appropriate, since "individual measures" may be needed to undo the
effects of the violations found by the court.
In addition to the payment of compensation, individual measures
may be required to ensure that the injured party is put, as far as
possible, in the same situation as he or she enjoyed prior to the
violation of the Convention (restitutio in integrum). For example,
where the Court has found a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention caused by the refusal to allow adequate contact
between a parent and a child in public care, the State will be
required to facilitate more frequent access visits; in a deportation
case under Article 3 or 8, the deportation order should be quashed;
and so on.60

It is in cases of this sort that distinctive elements of the enforcement
system under the Convention begin to emerge. First, under Article 41, "the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party," but
such a payment "is the only measure that the European Court can order a
State responsible for a violation of the Convention to take."61 Second,
under Article 46, the states who are parties to the Convention have agreed
"to abide by the final judgment of the court in any case in which they are
parties."62
Lastly, Article 46 further provides that the Committee of
Ministers "shall supervise" the execution of ECHR judgments. 63 The court
itself recently provided a succinct summary of the enforcement process:
The Court recalls that a judgment in which it fmds a breach
imposes on the respondent state a legal obligation to put an end to
that breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a
way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the
breach (restitutio in integrum). However, if restitutio in integrum
is in practice impossible the respondent states are free to choose
the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the
Court has found a breach, and the Court will not make
consequential orders or declaratory statements in this regard. It
60. OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 425.
61. LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 13.
62. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 46.
63. !d.
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falls to the Committee of Ministers acting under Article 54 of the
Convention to supervise compliance in this respect. ...64

The fact that the principles that govern the enforcement process remain
entirely unarticulated in the Convention has not prevented the achievement
of an appropriate outcome in most cases. In Soering v. United Kingdom,65
for example, the applicant had fled to England after murdering his
girlfriend's parents in Virginia, and he resisted extradition to Virginia,
where he faced the death penalty. 66 The ECHR held that due to the
extremely difficult conditions which he would experience during a lengthy
time on death row if sentenced to death, including the mental anguish
imposed by the approach of an execution date, implementation of the
United Kingdom Secretary of State's decision to extradite Soering would
violate Article 3 of the Convention. 67 Soering requested that the court give
"directions in relation to the operation" of the court's judgment, but the
court declined to do so:
No breach of Article 3 has as yet occurred. Nevertheless, the
Court having found that the Secretary of State's decision to
. extradite to the United States of America would, if implemented,
give rise to a breach of Article 3, Article 50 [the prior Article
providing for just satisfaction] must be taken as applying to the
facts of the present case.
The Court considers that its finding regarding Article 3 of itself
amounts to adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article
50. The Court is not empowered under the Convention to make
accessory directions of the kind requested by the applicant. By
virtue of Article 54 [the predecessor of Article 46], the
responsibility for supervising execution of the Court's judgment
rests with the Committee of Ministers of the Council ofEurope.68

The court's confidence that its judgment in Soering would be
implemented was fully justified. The United Kingdom informed the United
States that it would not extradite Soering so long as he would face capital
64. Orhan v. Turkey, App. No. 25656/94, 'If 451 (2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.intlhudocNiewRoot.asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=328000209&Notice=O&Noticemode=
&RelatedMode=O (last visited March 22, 2004).
65. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot.
asp?Item=O&Action=Htmi&X=326195625&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O
(last
visited March 22, 2004).
66. Id. '1['1[11-15, 76.
67. Id. '1['1[76-80. Article 3, in addition to outlawing torture, prohibits subjecting anyone to
"inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 2.
68. Id. '1['1[126--27 (citations omitted).
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charges, and extradition took place only after the United States gave
assurances that the death penalty would not be sought.69
Soering is but one of many cases in which the enforcement of the
court's judgments is not made ineffective simply because it is somewhat
indirect. Under the provisions of the Convention quoted above, it is not at
all surprising that the obligation of a state to comply with judgments of the
ECHR "has always been interpreted as being purely an obligation to
produce a specific result," leaving to the state the choice of the means blo
which that result will be brought about within the domestic legal system. 0
The rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers to govern their actions
under Article 46 specifically recognize that in deciding what individual or
general measures are required, the Committee must take into account "the
discretion of the state concerned to choose the means necessary to comply
with the judgment ...."71 Nonetheless, while the initiative rests with the
state found to have violated the Convention, the Committee reserves for
itself the ultimate decision on whether "individual measures have been
taken to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the injured party is put,
as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior to the
violation of the Convention."72
The approach taken by the Committee to bring about compliance with
respect to the individual claimant depends upon the critical fact that no case
in which the ECHR fmds a violation of the Convention is over until the
Committee of Ministers concludes that execution of the judgment has been
achieved.73 Rule 4a provides as follows: "Until the State concerned has
provided information on the payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the
Court or concerning possible individual measures, the case shall be placed
on the agenda of each human rights meeting of the Committee of Ministers,
unless the Committee decides otherwise."74 Since the Committee addresses
human rights enforcement matters in six meetings each year, 75 this schedule
provides for frequent re-examination of a pending case to determine
whether adequate steps have been taken by the state to comply with the
69. Soering was later extradited, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied his petition for habeas corpus, Soering v.
Deeds, No. 99-6498, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15443, at *18 (June 8, 2000), cert. denied, 531
u.s. 1074 (2001).
70. LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 6 (citing Belilios v. Switzerland, 10 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 466, 492 'lf78 (1988)).
71. Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 3b.
72. Id.
73. Jd. at Rule 4.
74. Id. atRule4a.
75. OVEY&WHITE,supranote 16, at422.
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principle of restitutio in integrum. The ECHR will not order a state to take
any particular steps, nor will the Committee, but only when the Committee
is satisfied that the measures taken are adequate will the Committee enter
the final resolution in the case.76
A comprehensive survey of the individual measures taken in cases
decided by the ECHR provides an instructive list of the types of relief that
may be adopted by a state to bring about execution of a judgment:
The resumption of the domestic judicial proceedings is
undoubtedly the most spectacular effect which an international
judgment can have. The importance of that measure, and the fact
that it is the only effective remedy in certain cases, [led] the
Committee of Ministers to adopt a Recommendation to the States
on that point. ...
Now the majority of European states allow for the re-opening
of domestic judicial proceedings .... In practice, this measure has
remained the exception: by December 2000 the domestic
proceedings had been re-opened in fewer than 15 cases following
a judgment of the European Court, half of these being criminal
matters
[The] greater supervision by the Committee of Ministers is
evidence of what for a number of years has been a growing
consideration for the future of the individual. The re-opening of
the proceedings has been regarded by the European Court as a
measure as close to restitutio in integrum as was possible.
Other individual measures may be equally varied. First of all,
the State concerned may decide not to enforce the national
measure at issue, including where it is a judgment, or the measure
may be annulled .... In criminal matters, a decision to reduce the
penalty may be taken at domestic level. Removal of the
conviction from the individual police record is also quite
frequently recognised.77

As to the taking of individual measures, then, the range of possibilities
is quite broad, and at least in some instances, the Committee of Ministers
has made aggressive use of its power not to close out a case until it
76. See, e.g., Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 8.
77. LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 15-19.
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considers the provisions made by the state for the applicant to have truly
placed him or her in the same position as if no violation had occurred. The
author of the summary quoted above has concluded that "the European
system sometimes proves to be rather ineffective in terms of the adoption of
individual non-pecuniary measures, so that the individual is in a sense the
poor relation of the system."78 That 'Wpears to be a fair assessment,
although less true today than in the past, and it certainly is the case that
the provision of individual relief is handled relatively informally, and is not
-an area that receives particularly focused attention by the Committee of
Ministers. It is not that states stubbornly refuse to take individual measures
considered necessary by the Committee, but rather that the entire question
of individual measures receives much less attention than just satisfaction
(where the definite order to pay is easily monitored for compliance) and
general measures (where the future impact on the state and its citizens is
much more likely to be significant). 80
The court may be edging toward taking a more assertive posture
towards the form of individual measures taken by a respondent state. For
example, in Brumarescu v. Romania,81 the court's judgment of January 23,
2001, recognized that parties are "in principle free to choose the means
whereby they will comply with a judgment," but went on to declare that
under the particular circumstances "return of the property in issue ... would
put the applicant as far as possible in the situation equivalent to the one in
which he would have been if there had not been a breach ...."82 The court
directed that "the State should therefore restore [the applicant's] title to the
rest of the house,"83 though it softened this injunction by specifying the
amount of pecuniary damage to be paid if the property was not returned. 84
GENERAL MEASURES

The Committee of Ministers does not consider the judgment of the
ECHR to have been executed, even if the award of just satisfaction has been
paid and necessary individual measures taken with regard to the applicant,

78. Id. at 20.

79. Id.
80. OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 423, 427.
81. 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2001), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlhudocNiewRoot.
asp?Item=1&Action=Html&X=326200216&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O
(last
visited March 22, 2004).
82. Jd. ,,20, 22.
83. Id. 122.
84. Id. 1120-24.
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until "general measures have been adopted, preventing new violations
similar to that or those found or putting an end to continuing violations."85
A case like McCann86 (the case involving the killings on Gibraltar)
might not call for any general measures, since there was no reason to
anticipate a repetition of the incident. However, the more typical case
coming before the court involves a statute, rule, or other governmental
policy that, if left unaltered, would inevitably lead to similar violations in
the future. Some examples of general measures have been provided above,
and many more are available for examination. As with individual measures,
the ultimate outcome reached involves the interplay of the state's
opportunity and responsibility to take the initiative (with the court and the
Committee without power to prescribe any particular approach) with the
state's obligation to satisfy the Committee as to the adequacy of the steps it
has taken in order to obtain the closing of the matter. The procedure used to
resolve these sometimes sticky matters is specified in Rule 4 of the
Committee ofMinisters:
If the state concerned informs the Committee of Ministers that it is
not yet in a position to inform the Committee that the general
measures necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment have
been taken, the case shall be placed again on the agenda of a
meeting of the Committee of Ministers taking place no more than
six months later, unless the Committee decides otherwise; the
same rule shall apply when this period expires and for each
subsequent period.87

As the case of Lustig-Prean88 (described above, in which the ECHR
found a violation in the United Kingdom's exclusion of homosexuals from
its armed forces) demonstrates, the general measures taken following the
court's finding of a violation have sometimes been quite dramatic and far
reaching in their impact (in that case, prompt revocation of the exclusionary
policy): Sometimes a step as formal as the amendment of a constitution or
statute is called for; while at other times, it has been sufficient to alter a
government's policy, rely upon the national courts to apply the law newly
announced by the ECHR, or publicize the court's ruling to relevant officials
85. Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 3b.
86. 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1996), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot.
asp?ltem=O&Action=Html&X=326192922&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last
visited March 22, 2004).
87. Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 4b.
88. 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548 (2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot.
asp?ltem=1&Action=Html&X=326193203&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last
visited March 22, 2004).
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of the state's agencies so that they may be aware of the holding and comply
with it.
Perhaps the most remarkable result of the enforcement system for
ECHR judgments is the affected states have almost universally taken the
necessary steps to satisfy the Committee that future violations are not likely
to occur. It should be noted that an important but somewhat hazy
jurisdictional line exists. The Committee of Ministers oversees the
enforcement of the judgments of the court and will not close the matter by
adopting its final resolution until it is satisfied that the state has taken
adequate steps to prevent repetitions of the violation that occurred. 89
However, once the state adopts general measures and the Committee
concludes that it has carried out its functions under Article 46, any
allegations that the new provision or statute or policy of the state is itself
violative of the Convention or is being applied so as to violate the
Convention must be brought back before the court in a new case.90 Thus,
the question of general measures inevitably invites a certain degree of
prejudgment by the Committee of possible future cases, but the adjudication
of any such cases lies fully with the court, not the Committee.
ENFORCEMENT CONTROVERSIES

It would be misleading to conclude this piece, which lauds the generally
high level of enforcement of ECHR judgments and describes some of the
mechanisms by which that goal is achieved, without acknowledging that
there have been controversies-even bitter ones-on occasion. While their
occurrence does not, in my view, call for abandoning the views expressed
above, they do shed some light on the inherent limitations of the
enforcement system under the Convention.
The ECHR announced its judgment in Loizidou v. Turke/ 1 on July 28,
1998, holding that the applicant, a Greek Cypriot, was entitled to
compensation because she had been denied use of her property after the area
she lived in was occupied by the Turkish army in 1974.92 Turkey refused to
pay the award of just satisfaction, leading the Committee of Ministers to
adopt an interim resolution on July 24, 2000, stating that Turkey's refusal to
satisfy the judgment "demonstrates a manifest disregard for its international
89.

OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 427; Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule

3b.
90. Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 8.
91. Available at http:/!hudoc.ecbr.coe.intlhudocNiewRoot.asp?Item=2&Action=Html&
X=326202947&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last visited March 22, 2004).
92. Jd.12-14, 26.
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obligations."93
On June 26, 2001, the Committee deplored Turkey's
continuing failure to comply, and declared its "resolve to ensure, with all
the means available to the Organisation, Turkey's compliance with its
obligations under this judgment."94 Even so, it took another eighteen
months of further pressure by the Committee before the award was finally
paid.95 Turkey has been and remains a major enforcement problem, not
only with regard to the many claims similar to Loizidou's that are being
presented, but also with regard to numerous judgments arising out of
Convention violations found by the court to have been committed by the
Turkish security forces.
The Committee has been unable to secure
enforcement of the court's judgments in these cases.96
Another problem area that the Committee has not been able to deal with
satisfactorily is the inordinate delay experienced by many litigants in Italy,
which has been found again and again to violate the Convention.97 "Here it
appears that some small progress is being made, although to a certain extent
it appears that the problems within the Italian legal system are so deep
rooted and pernicious that there is a limit to what the Government can do to
. . . bring about effective reform."98 While these continuing violations in
Italy are a serious matter, they present quite a different problem than the
refusal of a government to pay an award of just satisfaction or to take
identifiable steps to deal with a discrete problem.
The Committee's
difficulties in forcing Italy to improve its court system sufficiently to
comply with the Convention resembles in some ways the thorniest of the
structural remedy cases in the United States, which have on occasion
generated years or even decades of litigation over the desegregation of
school systems or the overhaul of prisons or institutions housing the
disabled in order to provide a constitutionally adequate level of services.99
93. Interim Resolution DH (2000) 105 Concerning the Judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights of 28 July 1998 in the Case of Loizidou Against Turkey 'if 7, available at
http://cm.coe.int/talres/xh/2000/0-299/2000xh105.htm (last visited March 22, 2004).
94. Interim Resolution ResDH (2001) 80 Concerning the Judgment of the European Court
of Human Rights of 28 July 1998 in the Case of Loizidou Against Turkey 'if 8, available at
http://cm.coe.int/talres/xh/2001/0-299/2001xh80.htm (last visited March 22, 2004).
95. Interim Resolution ResDH (2003) 174 Concerning the Judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights of 28 July 1998 in the Case of Loizidou Against Turkey, available at
https://wcm.coe.int!ViewDoc.jsp?id=85771&Lang=en (last visited March 22, 2004).
See
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, Turkey Complies with European Court Ruling on Cyprus, But
Ankara Still "On Hold" on Cyprus, EU, December 5, 2003.
96. OVEY & WIDTE, supra note 16, at 429--30.
97. !d. at 430.
98. !d.
99. See e.g., United States v. Bd. ofEduc., 372 F.2d 836, 860 (5th Cir. 1966) (describing
difficulties implementing desegregation); Finney v. Mabry, 534 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(rejecting initial effort to reform prison system).
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Of course, not even the most ambitious civil rights litigation in the United
States has attempted to reform the nation's entire court system. 100
SEPARATION OF POWERS

One additional aspect of the enforcement system under the European
Convention should be mentioned briefly. Within the United States, through
the use of remands, the immediate responsibility for enforcing the decisions
of the courts falls on the courts themselves. The lower courts are charged
with interpreting and applying the decisions made by the Supreme Court
and other appellate courts. Further review by the appellate courts is always
a possibility if questions arise as to whether the implementation of an
appellate decision is consistent.
JudFents of the ECHR are final and not appealable to any other
Moreover, there is no judicial role in enforcement of the
court.10
judgments. The Committee of Ministers, a non-judicial body made up of
representatives of the governments of the member states of the Council of
Europe, 102 has the authority to determine when a judgment has been fully
executed.103 While the ECHR's decision and reasoning obviously inform
the Committee's deliberations, the process is inevitably more political than
it would be if carried out by independent judicial officers.
The enforcement process before the Committee can be very political,
especially if the violating state simply refuses to comply. Expulsion from
the Council of Europe is possible under such circumstances, but it has been
observed that "the harsh nature of that measure has rendered it wholly
inappropriate and thus far it has not been put into practice."104 However,
concern about possible expulsion presumably motivated Greece to
withdraw from the Council of Europe for four years in the early 1970s,
when widespread human rights violations committed by the military
government were challenged.105 Likewise, while Turkey may not fear
immediate expulsion from the Council of Europe for its delays in paying
100. Kalashnikov v. Russia, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (2002), may well mark the beginning of
another major crisis over enforcement. The Court found that a criminal defendant's conditions
of confinement violated Article 3, id. 103, yet there may well be thousands of other Russian
prisoners held under similar or even worse conditions.
101. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 46, 1.
102. !d. at article 38.
103. OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 421-23; Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at
Rule 8.
104. LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 38.
105. See e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African
Union Treaty and Human Rights, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1177, 1205-06 (2002).
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judgments like that in Loizidou or even for the abuses being committed by
its security forces, it does aspire to membership in the European Union. 106
Turkey has encountered substantial difficulty in pursuing its European
Union candidacy, 107 and would no doubt be correct in concluding that a
substantially improved human rights record (measured at least in part by
enforcement of the ECHR judgments against it) is a necessary if not
sufficient condition for admission to the European Union.

CONCLUSION

Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are enforced by a
process that is quite unlike the enforcement processes common in the
United States.
Most notably, there is no prospect of remand from the
European Court, and the court plays no role in enforcing its judgments. The
court can award "just satisfaction" to a successful claimant in the form of a
monetary payment but is without power to enter any injunction or specify
any other action to be taken by the offending state.
Despite these dramatic differences between the European and American
processes for assuring compliance, the two systems seem to achieve similar
results. Though somewhat indirect from the American point of view, the
ECHR/Committee of Ministers process has achieved a high level of
compliance by the states. Despite the occasional problems encountered
under the Convention, the successful enforcement of ECHR judgments
strongly suggests that enforcement of judicial decisions in no way depends
·
on remands.

106. See e.g., Craig S. Smith, Turks Say to Europe: Can't We Just Come as We Are?, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 23,2002, at A-3.
107. Id.

